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of discrimination in her performance evalu-
ations or other treatment on the job.
Thus, the record reveals that her hostile
work environment claim is not sustainable.
IV. An At Will Employee May Assert
Section 1981 Claims
[11] This Court has held that claims of
an at-will employee for discrimination are
proper under Section 1981 for the reasons
set forth in Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission v. Die Fliedermaus,
L.L.C., 77 F.Supp.2d 460, 469–70 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
In this case, however, Ricks’ claims un-
der Section 1981 are dismissed because,
just as she has failed to create a triable
issue of fact with respect to her Title VII
claims, so she has failed to do with respect
to her Section 1981 claims.  See Hum-
phrey v. Council of Jewish Federations,
901 F.Supp. 703, 710–11 (S.D.N.Y.1995).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the mo-
tion for summary judgment is therefore
granted.
It is so ordered.
,
  
UMG RECORDINGS, INC., Sony Music
Entertainment Inc., Warner Bros.
Records Inc., Arista Records Inc., At-
lantic Recordings Corp., BMG Music
d/b/a The RCA Records Label, Capitol
Records, Inc., Elektra Entertainment
Group, Inc., Interscope Records, and
Sire Records Group Inc., Plaintiffs,
v.
MP3.COM, INC., Defendant.
No. 00 Civ. 472(JSR).
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
May 4, 2000.
Owners of copyrights in musical re-
cordings sued Internet company, which
made MP3 files of recordings available to
its subscribers, for infringement. On plain-
tiffs’ motion for partial summary judg-
ment, the District Court, Rakoff, J., held
that defendant’s conduct was not fair use.
Motion granted.
1. Copyrights and Intellectual Property
O53.2
Relevant, non-statutory factors may
be considered in determining whether al-
leged infringement of copyright is fair use;
fair use is equitable rule of reason, to be
applied in light of overall purposes of
Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
2. Copyrights and Intellectual Property
O66
Company’s unlicensed copying of
copyrighted musical recordings onto
‘‘MP3’’ files for access by its subscribers
over Internet was not ‘‘fair use’’; retrans-
mission of recordings did not create new
form of expression, recordings were being
used in their entirety, and company’s activ-
ity usurped market opportunity to which
copyright holders were entitled.  17
U.S.C.A. § 107.
 See publication Words and Phras-
es for other judicial constructions
and definitions.
3. Copyrights and Intellectual Property
O75
Copyright holders’ reasonable exer-
cise of their right to determine which in-
fringers to pursue, and in which order to
pursue them, was not copyright misuse.
Robert A. Goodman, Arnold & Porter,
New York City, Hadrian R. Katz, Jule L.
Sigall, Helene T. Krasnoff, Washington,
DC, Steven B. Fabrizio, Washington, DC,
for UMG Recordings, Inc., Sony Music
Entertainment Inc., Arista Records Inc.,
BMG Music.
Katherine B. Forrest, Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, New York City, Robert A. Good-
man, Arnold & Porter, New York City,
Evan R. Chesler, Cravath Swaine &
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Moore, New York City, Hadrian R. Katz,
Jule L. Sigall, Helene T. Krasnoff, Wash-
ington, DC, Steven B. Fabrizio, Washing-
ton, DC, for Warner Bros. Records Inc.,
Atlantic Recording Corp.
Steven Neal and Michael Rhodes of
Cooley Godward LLP, San Diego, CA, Mi-
chael B. Carlinsky, Jeffrey A. Conciatori,
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, L.L.P.,
New York City, for MP3.Com, Inc.
OPINION
RAKOFF, District Judge.
The complex marvels of cyberspatial
communication may create difficult legal
issues;  but not in this case.  Defendant’s
infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights is
clear.  Accordingly, on April 28, 2000, the
Court granted defendant’s motion for par-
tial summary judgment holding defendant
liable for copyright infringement.  This
opinion will state the reasons why.
The pertinent facts, either undisputed
or, where disputed, taken most favorably
to defendant, are as follows:
The technology known as ‘‘MP3’’ per-
mits rapid and efficient conversion of com-
pact disc recordings (‘‘CDs’’) to computer
files easily accessed over the Internet.
See generally Recording Industry Ass’n of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073–74 (9th Cir.
1999).  Utilizing this technology, defen-
dant MP3.com, on or around January 12,
2000, launched its ‘‘My.MP3.com’’ service,
which is advertised as permitting subscrib-
ers to store, customize and listen to the
recordings contained on their CDs from
any place where they have an Internet
connection.  To make good on this offer,
defendant purchased tens of thousands of
popular CDs in which plaintiffs held the
copyrights, and, without authorization,
copied their recordings onto its computer
servers so as to be able to replay the
recordings for its subscribers.
Specifically, in order to first access such
a recording, a subscriber to MP3.com must
either ‘‘prove’’ that he already owns the
CD version of the recording by inserting
his copy of the commercial CD into his
computer CD–Rom drive for a few seconds
(the ‘‘Beam-it Service’’) or must purchase
the CD from one of defendant’s cooperat-
ing online retailers (the ‘‘instant Listening
Service’’).  Thereafter, however, the sub-
scriber can access via the Internet from a
computer anywhere in the world the copy
of plaintiffs’ recording made by defendant.
Thus, although defendant seeks to portray
its service as the ‘‘functional equivalent’’ of
storing its subscribers’ CDs, in actuality
defendant is re-playing for the subscribers
converted versions of the recordings it
copied, without authorization, from plain-
tiffs’ copyrighted CDs. On its face, this
makes out a presumptive case of infringe-
ment under the Copyright Act of 1976
(‘‘Copyright Act’’), 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
See, e.g., Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc.
v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 137 (2d Cir.1998);  Hasbro Bradley,
Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189,
192 (2d Cir.1985).1
[1] Defendant argues, however, that
such copying is protected by the affirma-
tive defense of ‘‘fair use.’’  See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.  In analyzing such a defense, the
Copyright Act specifies four factors that
must be considered:  ‘‘(1) the purpose and
1. Defendant’s only challenge to plaintiffs’ pri-
ma facie case of infringement is the sugges-
tion, buried in a footnote in its opposition
papers, that its music computer files are not
in fact ‘‘reproductions’’ of plaintiffs’ copy-
righted works within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
Specifically, defendant claims that the sim-
ulated sounds on MP3–based music files are
not physically identical to the sounds on the
original CD recordings.  See Def.’s Consoli-
dated Opp. to Pls.’ Motions for Partial
Summ.J. at 13–14 n. 9. Defendant concedes,
however, that the human ear cannot detect a
difference between the two.  Id. Moreover,
defendant admits that a goal of its copying is
to create a music file that is sonically as
identical to the original CD as possible.  See
Goodman Reply Aff., Robertson Dep., Ex. A,
at 85.  In such circumstances, some slight,
humanly undetectable difference between the
original and the copy does not qualify for
exclusion from the coverage of the Act.
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character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;  (2) the na-
ture of the copyrighted work;  (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole;  and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.’’  Id. Other relevant
factors may also be considered, since fair
use is an ‘‘equitable rule of reason’’ to be
applied in light of the overall purposes of
the Copyright Act. Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 448, 454, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78
L.Ed.2d 574 (1984);  see Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539, 549, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d
588 (1985).
[2] Regarding the first factor—‘‘the
purpose and character of the use’’—defen-
dant does not dispute that its purpose is
commercial, for while subscribers to My.
MP3.com are not currently charged a fee,
defendant seeks to attract a sufficiently
large subscription base to draw advertising
and otherwise make a profit.  Consider-
ation of the first factor, however, also in-
volves inquiring into whether the new use
essentially repeats the old or whether, in-
stead, it ‘‘transforms’’ it by infusing it with
new meaning, new understandings, or the
like.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff–Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 114 S.Ct.
1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994);  Castle Rock,
150 F.3d at 142;  See also Pierre N. Leval,
‘‘Toward a Fair Use Standard,’’ 103 Harv.
L.Rev. 1105, 111 (1990).  Here, although
defendant recites that My.MP3.com pro-
vides a transformative ‘‘space shift’’ by
which subscribers can enjoy the sound re-
cordings contained on their CDs without
lugging around the physical discs them-
selves, this is simply another way of saying
that the unauthorized copies are being re-
transmitted in another medium—an insuf-
ficient basis for any legitimate claim of
transformation, See, e.g., Infinity Broad-
cast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir.1998) (rejecting the fair use de-
fense by operator of a service that retrans-
mitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over
telephone lines);  Los Angeles News Serv.
v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d
987 (9th Cir.1998) (rejecting the fair use
defense where television news agencies
copied copyrighted news footage and re-
transmitted it to news organizations), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1141, 119 S.Ct. 1032, 143
L.Ed.2d 41 (1999);  see also American Geo-
physical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 923 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S.
1005, 116 S.Ct. 592, 133 L.Ed.2d 486
(1995);  Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s
Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1530–31
(S.D.N.Y.1991);  see generally Leval, su-
pra, at 1111 (repetition of copyrighted ma-
terial that ‘‘merely repackages or repub-
lishes the original’’ is unlikely to be
deemed a fair use).
Here, defendant adds no new ‘‘new
aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings’’ to the original music recordings it
copies, see Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142
(internal quotation marks omitted), but
simply repackages those recordings to fa-
cilitate their transmission through another
medium.  While such services may be in-
novative, they are not transformative.2
Regarding the second factor—‘‘the na-
ture of the copyrighted work’’—the crea-
tive recordings here being copied are
‘‘close[ ] to the core of intended copyright
protection,’’ Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114
S.Ct. 1164, and, conversely, far removed
from the more factual or descriptive work
more amenable to ‘‘fair use,’’ see Nihon
2. Defendant’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s
‘‘reverse engineering’’ cases, see Sony Com-
puter Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.2000);  Sega Enterprises
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527
(9th Cir.1992), is misplaced, because, among
other relevant distinctions, those cases in-
volved the copying of software in order to
develop a new product, see Sony Computer
Entertainment, 203 F.3d at 606;  Sega Enter-
prises, 977 F.2d at 1522, whereas here defen-
dant copied CDs onto its servers not to create
any new form of expression but rather to
retransmit the same expression in a different
medium.
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Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir.
1999);  see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at
143–44.
Regarding the third factor—‘‘the
amount and substantiality of the portion
[of the copyrighted work] used [by the
copier] in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole’’—it is undisputed that defen-
dant copies, and replays, the entirety of
the copyrighted works here in issue, thus
again negating any claim of fair use.  See
Infinity Broadcast, 150 F.3d at 109 (‘‘[T]he
more of a copyrighted work that is taken,
the less likely the use is to be fair TTTT’’);
see generally Leval, supra, at 1122 (‘‘[T]he
larger the volume TTT of what is taken, the
greater the affront to the interests of the
copyright owner, and the less likely that a
taking will qualify as a fair use’’).
Regarding the fourth factor—‘‘the ef-
fect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work’’—
defendant’s activities on their face invade
plaintiffs’ statutory right to license their
copyrighted sound recordings to others
for reproduction.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Defendant, however, argues that, so far as
the derivative market here involves is
concerned, plaintiffs have not shown that
such licensing is ‘‘traditional, reasonable,
or likely to be developed.’’  American
Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930 & n. 17.
Moreover, defendant argues, its activities
can only enhance plaintiffs’ sales, since
subscribers cannot gain access to particu-
lar recordings made available by MP3.com
unless they have already ‘‘purchased’’ (ac-
tually or purportedly), or agreed to pur-
chase, their own CD copies of those re-
cordings.
Such arguments—though dressed in the
garb of an expert’s ‘‘opinion’’ (that, on
inspection, consists almost entirely of spec-
ulative and conclusory statements)—are
unpersuasive.  Any allegedly positive im-
pact of defendant’s activities on plaintiffs’
prior market in no way frees defendant to
usurp a further market that directly de-
rives from reproduction of the plaintiffs’
copyrighted works.  See Infinity Broad-
cast, 150 F.3d at 111.  This would be so
even if the copyrightholder had not yet
entered the new market in issue, for a
copyrighterholder’s ‘‘exclusive’’ rights, de-
rived from the Constitution and the Copy-
right Act, include the right, within broad
limits, to curb the development of such a
derivative market by refusing to license a
copyrighted work or by doing so only on
terms the copyright owner finds accept-
able.  See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145–46;
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d
90, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890,
108 S.Ct. 213, 98 L.Ed.2d 177 (1987).
Here, moreover, plaintiffs have adduced
substantial evidence that they have in fact
taken steps to enter that market by enter-
ing into various licensing agreements.
See, e.g., Forrest R. Aff., Ex. F., Vidich
Dep. at 61–63;  id., Ex. N;  Goodman R.
Aff., Ex. B., Silver Dep. at 64–65;  id., Ex.
D, Eisenberg Dep. at 130–32;  id., Ex. E.,
Evans Dep. 145–48.
Finally, regarding defendant’s purported
reliance on other factors, see Campbell,
510 U.S. at 577, 114 S.Ct. 1164, this essen-
tially reduces to the claim that My.
MP3.com provides a useful service to con-
sumers that, in its absence, will be served
by ‘‘pirates.’’  Copyright, however, is not
designed to afford consumer protection or
convenience but, rather, to protect the
copyrightholders’ property interests.
Moreover, as a practical matter, plaintiffs
have indicated no objection in principle to
licensing their recordings to companies
like MP3.com;  they simply want to make
sure they get the remuneration the law
reserves for them as holders of copyrights
on creative works.  Stripped to its essence,
defendant’s ‘‘consumer protection’’ argu-
ment amounts to nothing more than a bald
claim that defendant should be able to
misappropriate plaintiffs’ property simply
because there is a consumer demand for it.
This hardly appeals to the conscience of
equity.
[3] In sum, on any view, defendant’s
‘‘fair use’’ defense is indefensible and must
be denied as a matter of law.  Defendant’s
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other affirmative defenses, such as copy-
right misuse, abandonment, unclean hands,
and estoppel, are essentially frivolous and
may be disposed of briefly.  While defen-
dant contends, under the rubric of copy-
right misuse, that plaintiffs are misusing
their ‘‘dominant market position to selec-
tively prosecute only certain online music
technology companies,’’ Def.’s Consolidat-
ed Opp. to Pls.’ Motions for Summ.J. at 21,
the admissible evidence of records shows
only that plaintiffs have reasonably exer-
cised their right to determine which in-
fringers to pursue, and in which order to
pursue them, cf.  Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Peppermint Club, Inc., 1985 WL 6141, at
*4 (N.D.Ohio Dec.16, 1985).  The abandon-
ment defense must also fall since defen-
dant has failed to adduce any competent
evidence of an overt act indicating that
plaintiffs, who filed suit against MP3.com
shortly after MP3.com launched its in-
fringing My.MP3.com service, intentionally
abandoned their copyrights.  See Richard
Feiner & Co., Inc. v. H.R. Indus., Inc., 10
F.Supp.2d 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1998).  Simi-
larly, defendant’s estoppel defense must be
rejected because defendant has failed to
provide any competent evidence that it
relied on any action by plaintiffs with re-
spect to defendant’s My.MP3.com service.
Finally, the Court must reject defendant’s
unclean hands defense given defendant’s
failure to come forth with any admissible
evidence showing bad faith or misconduct
on the part of plaintiffs.  See generally
Dunlop–McCullen v. Local 1–S, AFL–
CIO–CLC, 149 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1998);
A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp.,
389 F.2d 11, 18 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 835, 89 S.Ct. 109, 21 L.Ed.2d 106
(1968).3
The Court has also considered defen-
dant’s other points and arguments and
finds them sufficiently without merit as not
to warrant any further comment.
Accordingly, the Court, for the forego-
ing reasons, has determined that plaintiffs
are entitled to partial summary judgment
holding defendant to have infringed plain-
tiffs’ copyrights.
,
  
Danielle Lee DUSHARM, Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant.
No. 2:97–CV–371.
United States District Court,
D. Vermont.
April 14, 2000.
Automobile passenger injured in mul-
ti-victim accident sought declaration that
passenger’s mother’s automobile insurance
policy provided underinsured motorist
(UIM) coverage. Passenger also sought ad-
ditional UIM coverage based on insurer’s
failure to obtain mother’s informed elec-
tion for decreased UIM limits. Both par-
ties moved for summary judgment. Follow-
ing the District Court’s determination that
tortfeasor was underinsured, 47 F.Supp.2d
514, Sessions, J., the Court held that: (1)
passenger was ‘‘relative’’ of mother and
thus an insured under mother’s policy; (2)
insurer was obligated to obtain mother’s
direction to decrease UM/UIM limits be-
low liability levels at time mother became
additional policyholder regardless of moth-
er’s status as car owner and regardless of
original policyholder’s election.
3. The Court also finds no reason to alter or
postpone its determination simply because of
the recent filing of the complaint in Lester
Chambers et al. v. Time Warner, Inc., et al., 00
Civ. 2839 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 12, 2000) (JSR),
the allegations of which, according to the
defendant here, call into question the exclu-
sivity of plaintiffs’ copyrights.  The allegations
of a complaint, having no evidentiary value,
cannot defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment.
